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Albania is among the most vulnerable countries to 
external energy shocks and climatic conditions, because 
of its high dependency on hydropower for electricity. 
Given highly volatile international energy prices and 
expected global warming, it is becoming increasingly 
important to manage the demand for electricity. 
However, the country has long been faced with a 
significant problem of electricity metering. About one-
third of total energy is lost for technical and nontechnical 
reasons. This paper estimates the residential demand 
function by applying a two-stage system equation 
This paper is a product of the  Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at aiimi@worldbank.org.  
method for an endogenous censored variable, because 
the lack of metering makes the electricity consumption 
partially observable for the econometrician. It is found 
that metering is important to curb non-essential 
electricity use by households. The electricity demand 
could also be reduced by raising the first block rate and 
lowering the second block rate and the threshold between 
the two blocks. In addition, weather conditions and 
home appliance ownership would affect the demand for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In recent years it has become increasingly important to understand the demand for electricity, 
because of highly volatile international energy prices and global warming expected in the 
future. How to manage the consumer demand for electricity remains a challenge for many 
developing and transition economies. To this end, metering is essential, because it is 
generally difficult to design an effective tariff structure without sufficient meters installed. 
Lack of metering also complicates other governance issues, such as electricity theft, and 
generates a significant adverse effect on the sector’s financial viability and the country’s 
energy security and growth.  
 
This paper examines the residential electricity demand in Albania, using micro data from the 
country’s household surveys. Particularly, it casts light on the potential impacts of metering 
and climatic conditions. To estimate the unbiased demand function, several important 
econometric issues need to be addressed, such as simultaneity between price and quantity, 
self-selection of metering, and partially observable electricity consumption. By using a two-
stage method, the paper will show that metering is an important determinant of the residential 
demand for electricity. It will also show that higher-than-usual temperature and increasing 
ownership of air conditioners would likely push up the electricity demand in Albania.  
 
Metering is a fundamental step for successful utilities to promote energy efficiency and 
financial sustainability. This may be intuitively obvious, but it is not as simple as it looks. 
For instance, the U.K. experience indicates that metering per se may not always be required 
for the utility service provision. In the United Kingdom, historically, only about one-third of 
domestic water users are metered. Hence, if the capacity of supply is sufficient and the 
demand is well predicted even in the absence of meters, utilities may not have to install 
meters. But this is very difficult in practice.
1  
                                                 
1 In the United Kingdom, water services have not been charged based on metering until recently. Given the 
2005 drought and severe water shortage, water supply companies embarked upon the metering program. By 
legislation, water companies in areas of serious water stress will be able to compulsorily meter customers from   - 3 -
 
In general, without proper metering, reading and billing, there is no incentive for consumers 
to rationalize their use of energy. Overconsumption is a typical problem caused by the lack of 
utility meters. When a customer has no meter, a certain amount of normative consumption is 
often assumed. The norm is designed to be consistent with how much people are actually 
using. But this is merely a proxy. Of particular note, the norm is usually fixed. Therefore, 
low levels of metering will provide wrong price incentives to customers. In addition, low 
metering may create a broader distortion in the whole price structure. This will affect not 
only unmetered but also metered customers. As a result, utility operators tend to be faced 
with a significant risk of financial nonviability. For instance, in Africa it is estimated that 
only 50 percent of electricity generated is paid for, because of low collection rates as well as 
high technical losses (Antmann, 2009).  
 
In Albania, technical and nontechnical electricity transmission and distribution losses have 
been substantial for a long time. The system losses amounted to 49 percent in 2000 and have 
been declining gradually. The donor community has been supporting the government’s 
efforts toward appropriate meter installation in Albania.
2 But the losses were still 35 percent 
in 2009, which is markedly high by any standards. Besides technical losses, one of the 
alleged reasons for the high losses is that metering might not be functioning properly. In 
Albania there has been concern about destruction, disconnection and manipulation of 
installed meters. Consequently, the country is estimated to lose about 2 percent of GDP of 
unaccounted-for energy every year. Not surprisingly, the state-owned electricity company 
was faced with significant financial difficulties until recently.
3  
                                                                                                                                                       
2010. The government expects the installation rates to reach at least 80 percent for most water supply 
companies by 2020 (Ofwat web).  
2 The World Bank reallocated some resources of the Power Transmission and Distribution Project (IDA Credit 
No. 2826-ALB) to financing for residential consumer meters in 2001-2003 (PAD 14532-ALB; 27049-ALB). 
However, the metering situation does not seem to have changed much during the assistance period.  
3 To deal with these systemic problems, the government decided to introduce the private sector into the 
electricity distribution segment in 2009. Note that the paper does not intend to provide any policy implication to 
the currently ongoing electricity privatization process in Albania. The main objective of this paper is more 
technical to estimate the effects of metering and climate change on the energy demand.   - 4 -
 
Climate change may add to the complexity of the problems in the energy sector. In Albania, 
energy efficiency is becoming more important from both energy security and climate change 
perspectives. The country is dependent more than 95 percent on hydropower for domestic 
electricity generation and therefore considered among the most vulnerable countries to 
external energy shocks and climatic conditions. In the past, severe droughts posed significant 
challenges on Albania (ESMAP, 2009). Meanwhile, the demand for electricity is steadily 
increasing with economic growth. As the result, if drought happens as in 2002 and 2007, the 
country will have to import a large amount of energy from abroad at significantly high costs. 
Otherwise, massive electricity supply cuts will be unavoidable (Figure 1). Therefore, long-
term energy planning and demand management continue to be critical for Albania to achieve 
energy security and economic growth. To this end, metering is expected to have an important 
role to play in incentivizing consumers to reduce non-essential use of electricity. The 
efficient energy use will mitigate the need for investment in new electricity generation 
capacity and thus contribute to emissions reduction.  
 



















Source: KESH data.  
 
Pricing is a key policy instrument to manage the demand for energy in general. It is not only 
about the level of prices but also about the structure of tariff. If prices are low and the 
demand is price-elastic, raising the prices can be a useful policy measure to contain the   - 5 -
electricity demand. In practice, however, the price structure is often complex and reflects 
various policy considerations, such as affordability of the poor and promotion of energy-
intensive industries. Therefore, the impacts of raised tariff may not be straightforward. An 
increasing block tariff mechanism is, for instance, a common practice to encourage large-
volume customers to use electricity wisely, while keeping the prices for the poor relatively 
low. However, this discriminatory pricing may adversely affect the households’ incentives to 
install a proper meter or falsify metering readings; people do not want to be applied to higher 
rates. Hence, the net impacts may remain debatable.  
 
The current paper analyzes household data from the Albania’s Living Standards 
Measurement Studies (LSMS) for 2002–2005. Because there are multiple endogeneity issues, 
it applies the Nelson-Olsen (1978) two-stage estimator, which models a system of censored 
and non-censored equations. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
summarizes the theoretical and practical issues related to metering. Section III discusses the 
possible effects of climatic conditions on the electricity demand, in particular in the context 
of Albania. Section IV develops an empirical model and discusses various econometric 
issues to estimate the electricity demand. Section V describes our data, and Section VI 
presents the main estimation results. Section VII discusses robustness of the estimation 
results and some policy implications. Section VIII then concludes.  
 
II. METERING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE  
 
Metering is an essential policy instrument to motivate customers to use electricity wisely. In 
theory, a simple model can show that people would overconsume electricity in the absence of 
metering. There is no incentive for overconsuming customers to install a meter, even if the 
cost of meter installation is small. By contrast, unmetered customers who are consuming less 
than the norm will have strong incentives to install a meter, if the installation cost is small 
enough. This self-selective process would end up with the overconsumption situation where 
unmetered customers would overconsume the utility services. One might think that 
overconsumption would not occur if the normative amount of consumption, which is applied   - 6 -
for unmetered customers, were consistent with what they are actually consuming. However, a 
fundamental difficulty exists for operators to set the optimal norm and other tariff structure 
under the low metering circumstances. See the Appendix for further detail.  
 
Proposition: There is no incentive for overconsuming customers to install a meter.  
 
Overconsumption has several important implications to utility operations. First, it means that 
the norm is too low. Therefore, a certain amount of consumption is left unbilled. Many 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are suffering from this problem (Antmann, 2009). Second, 
the too low norm in turn makes the average price upward biased. This is because someone 
has to pay unbilled electricity that unmetered customers are consuming without paying. In 
this regard, non-metering is a problem for not only unmetered but also metered customers; 
the upward biased tariff is applied to all the customers. Finally, if an overconsuming 
customer newly installs a meter, the overall average tariff can be reduced, holding everything 
else constant. Thus, for unmetered consumers, there is a tradeoff between the benefits from 
and costs of meter installation. In theory, however, even if this price reduction effect is taken 
into account, the above proposition still holds: unmetered customers would have no incentive 
to move from an unmetered to metered regime (see the Appendix).  
 
Besides overconsumption, low levels of metering would also make it difficult for policy 
makers or operators to implement advanced tariff mechanisms, such as tariff-based subsidies. 
Theoretically, conditional cash transfers are preferable to support energy consumption of the 
poor. However, tariff-based subsidies, such as increasing block tariffs, are still prevalent 
across countries (Komives et al., 2006). In the increasing block tariff structure, a relatively 
low marginal price is set for low-volume customers and a higher rate for large-volume 
consumers. This aims to not only address affordability for the poor―presumably, low-
volume customers―but also motivate large-volume consumers to refrain from non-essential   - 7 -
use of electricity.
4 In Albania, the increasing block tariff is mainly intended for the latter. 
Overconsumption by large-volume consumers is the primary target of the demand 
management.  
 
A practical challenge in implementing the discriminatory pricing is how to select an optimal 
threshold between the blocks. The lifeline consumption can be one possible option. In 
Georgia, it is estimated that the lifeline consumption would be 125 kWh per month, which 
will cover lighting and a modest number of home appliances, but not heating or air 
conditioning (Lampieti et al., 2007). But the optimal level differs across countries or cities 
(e.g., Komives et al., 2005). The Cape Verde’s block tariff mechanism had a much lower 
first block threshold, which was set at 40 kWh in 2001/02. By contrast, in Sao Tome and 
Principe the threshold was much high at 300 kWh in 2000/01 (Komives et al., 2006). 
Essentially, without knowing how much energy individual consumers are actually consuming, 
it is difficult to design an optimal stepped tariff structure. 
 
Regardless of its importance, there is no systematic data available on metering across 
countries. Fragmented evidence may exist. It indicates that metering remains a challenge in 
many developing and transition countries. Important, experience shows that the metering 
problem can be addressed quickly if appropriate policies are in place. In Tbilisi, the 
electricity meter installation rate was 38 percent in 2000 but improved to 76 percent in 2002 
(Lampietti et al., 2007). In Andhra Pradesh, India, only 42 percent of inflowing energy was 
metered and billed in 1998/99 (Antmann, 2009). In Bangladesh consumer payments 
accounted for only 55 percent of energy generated (Lovei and McKechnie, 2000).  
 
One of the proxies that represent the existing meter penetration and how effectively meters 
are functioning is the rate of electricity transmission and distribution losses. The variable is 
available for most countries (Figure 2). Nontechnical losses are partly attributable to the lack 
                                                 
4 There is argument as to whether the implicit assumption that low-income households are low-volume 
consumers is reasonable. It may depend on the size of family and dwelling and other factors (e.g., Besant-Jones, 
2006).    - 8 -
of metering. High system losses, whether technical or nontechnical, would incur large 
implicit fiscal deficits along with underpricing and nonpayment. This is often a significant 
problem in the electricity sector of developing countries. The quasi-fiscal deficits can amount 
to as much as 1 to 2 percent of GDP.
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Sources: KESH data for Albania; World Development Indicators for other countries.  
 
In Albania, the electricity system losses have been a long controversial issue, because they 
are extremely high by both global and regional standards (Figure 2). The losses, though 
gradually declining, were estimated at 35 percent in 2009. Despite some recent 
improvements, the Albania’s system is still losing about one-third of total energy produced 
(and imported).  
 
On paper, the meter penetration rate is already high in Albania. But the remaining deficiency 
has long been persistent, negatively affecting the whole governance in the electricity sector. 
According to the ERE data, about 100,000 electricity customers or about 11 percent of total 
                                                 
5 In Africa, the quasi-fiscal deficits in the electricity sector were estimated at almost zero to 4.7 percent of GDP 
with an average of 0.84 percent (Briceno-Garmendia et al., 2008). In the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, 
the deficits were estimated at nearly zero to 1.3 percent of GDP in 2003 (World Bank, 2006).    - 9 -
customers still did not have functioning electricity meters on March, 2008.
6 This national 
figure may not appear so critical. But in some northern districts, the vast majority of 
households remain to be equipped with electricity meters. The progress of meter installation 
is significantly different across regions (Figure 3). In addition, improper metering practices, 
such as malfunctioning meters, falsification of meter readings and illegal connections, have 
been real concern. 
 
Who do not yet have electricity meters? As discussed, the northern districts are lagging 
behind in this regard. By rural-urban classification, rural residents are less likely to have 
meters (Table 1). Based on household characteristics, it is also found that unmetered 
households are relatively poor; their average monthly income is significantly lower than 
metered households in a statistical sense. In addition, unmetered households have fewer 
home appliances. It seems that there is certain correlation among household income, meter 
installation, home appliance holding, and remoteness of their residences. Where metering is 
less prevalent, residents seem to have used relatively more electricity per month (see 












                                                 
6 There are some discrepancies in the data on the share of unmetered customers. While the ERE data come from 
the electricity operator and are considered comprehensive, the LSMS data are partial and can be reported 
wrongly by sample households. The metering share may have been improving in recent years. According to the 
latest 2008 LSMS data, the share of unmetered households is about 3 percent.    - 10 -
Figure 3. Meter installation rate and electricity consumption in Albania 
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Source: Author’s drawing based on LSMS 2005 and ERE data. 
 
 
Table 1. Household characteristics by electricity meter installation  
Variable 
With meter     Without meter     Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test 
statistics (z)  Obs. Mean Std.  
Dev.   Obs. Mean Std.  
Dev.    
Monthly income  4184 39094 55092    578 31758 32911    –5.64 *** 
Number of household members  4184 4.516 1.593 578 4.810 1.637  4.60 *** 
Urban resident  4184 0.679 0.467 578 0.484 0.500  –9.20 *** 
Number of home appliances: 
Color TV  4184 1.154 0.512 578 1.028 0.466  –6.00 *** 
Video 4184 0.373 0.504 578 0.280 0.461  –4.21 *** 
Refrigerator 4184 0.969 0.269 578 0.919 0.341  –4.26 *** 
Freezer 4184 0.012 0.121 578 0.019 0.149  1.38 
Washer 4184 0.739 0.449 578 0.576 0.505  –8.06 *** 
Dishwasher 4184 0.019 0.136 578 0.019 0.149  –0.26 
Electric or gas stove  4184 0.809 0.435 578 0.734 0.501  –4.15 *** 
Air conditioner  4184 0.087 0.340 578 0.050 0.287  –3.29 *** 
Water Boiler  4184 0.645 0.505 578 0.545 0.512  –4.43 *** 
Computer  4184 0.088 0.291    578 0.040 0.204    –3.94 *** 
Note: *** indicates the 1% significance level. 
 
In developing countries, low levels of metering tend to complicate other governance 
problems in the electricity sector. First, without reliable metering systems, electricity 
operators have little incentive to improve the system efficiency, because of their low   - 11 -
accountability. The reason is that technical and nontechnical losses are not distinguishable 
without sufficient meters. Therefore, the system losses may or may not be considered as their 
faults. The lack of capital investment in the network, for instance, may not fall on utilities. In 
Andhra Pradesh, the utility’s efforts to reduce the system losses began with recognition of the 
existing technical losses and theft. The technical losses, of which the former official estimate 
was 18 percent, were projected to be 38 percent (Antmann, 2009). This is a politically 
challenging yet essential step to strengthen the utility’s accountability.  
 
Second, the absence of metering may also weaken enforceability of payments, even if the 
norm is applied to unmetered customers. The reason is that people can always claim to have 
used nothing. In addition, given the weak metering practices, utility officials would likely 
have incentives to practice irregular billing and over-charging. On the other hand, customers 
may have incentives to pay a bribe and ask for falsification of meter readings. A survey in 
South Asian countries indicates that about 20 to 30 percent of customers are faced with 
endemic petty corruption through meter readers (Transparency International; World Bank, 
2009a). The same problem has been observed in the water sector. More than 70 percent water 
utility staff responded that meter falsification is very common to lower bills. And 41 percent 
of interviewed customers actually made informal payment to falsify meter readings (Davis, 
2004; World Bank, 2008). 
 
To deal with these problems, the private sector participation in the distribution network is 
one of the options that governments can take. Experience shows that it can promote proper 
metering, reading, billing and collection quickly, thereby improving the sector’s governance 
and performance. Apparently, nontechnical system losses are an obvious revenue leakage 
from the systems.
7 Therefore, private operators are willing to make efforts toward proper 
metering.
8 In Colombia, when an electricity distribution company serving the capital Bogota 
                                                 
7 The other area is obviously technical losses in the system. The relative easiness to address the problems 
depends on country. In Albania, about half of the total system losses are estimated to be attributed to 
nontechnical losses.  
8 Practically, a phased approach may be useful to address the metering issue. Because a small number of large 
consumers often represent a large amount of energy sales and revenue in the electricity sector. Hence, the   - 12 -
was unbundled and privatized, the company, CODENSA, installed 164,000 new meters and 
replaced 156,000 damaged or tampered meters. Along with other reforms, the company 
successfully decreased the total distribution losses from 22 percent in 1997 to 9 percent in 
2007 (Antmann, 2009). The marked improvement in payment collections in Tbilisi was also 
brought about by the distribution company privatization (Lampietti et al., 2007).  
 
From the analytical point of view, it is worth recalling that the current paper focuses on the 
pre-privatization period to examine the effects of metering and other exogenous conditions, 
not investigating the privatization effect. In Albania, the distribution system was privatized in 
2009, and the distribution company intends to achieve fully working universal metering by 
2010. It is too early to assess the performance, but the similar improvements are expected to 
the above-mentioned countries. Privatization can be one of the driving forces behind 
potential improvements in metering and other operational performance. Notably, however, 
the privatization effect is out of the scope of this paper.  
 
It is also important to note that the estimation results of this paper should be interpreted as a 
marginal effect of metering on the energy demand. In Albania, the metering rate has already 
been high at least on paper, as shown above. Thus, the direct impact of increased metering on 
the demand or utility revenue may not be significant.
9 However, as discussed, increasing 
metering is expected to help rationalize the pricing as well. Therefore, the pricing effect to be 
estimated is also important. The general implications from the estimation results could be 
referred to for discussing the metering problem in other countries where meters are missing 





                                                                                                                                                       
regularization of metering, billing and collection should be started from these large-volume customers. Then, 
smaller customers could gradually be covered. 
9 In fact, the share of flat rate billing is not significant in Albania. It was about 9 percent in 2009.    - 13 -
III. CLIMATE AND ELECTRICITY DEMAND  
 
The electricity demand depends on climatic conditions, such as maximum temperature during 
the summer and precipitation during the rainy season. This is an important implication to the 
current analysis. The literature shows that the climate would affect the electricity demand. 
With seasonal data in India, for instance, the price elasticity is found to range from –0.51 in 
the monsoon months to –0.29 in the summer months (Filippini and Pachauri, 2004). 
Although the elasticities generally look moderate, the demand in summer is more inelastic 
than that in the monsoon season. This implies that people would need more electricity in 
summer. In the United States, the electricity demand is also found to be dependent on daily 
temperature and humidity, in particular in summer (Hausman et al., 1979). Davis (2008) 
indicates that the household electricity demand is shifted by daily rainfall.  
 
The electricity demand is also affected by the ownership of home appliances. The residential 
electricity demand can be explained by whether households own air conditioners, water 
heaters, dishwashers, clothes washers and freezers (Hausman et al., 1979). Especially, air 
conditioners may have a large impact on the demand for electricity. Reiss and White (2005) 
show that the price elasticity for households with central or air conditioning is three times 
higher (in absolute terms) than that for those who have no air conditioning. As the result, the 
impact of air conditioning can be substantial, as in the United States during the late 1980s. It 
is estimated to have reached about one-third of the total electricity peak demand (Andrew, 
1989). In Hong Kong, heating, ventilation and air-conditioning are found to be the single 
largest electricity end-user, accounting for 30 to 60 percent of the total electrical demand 
during the hot summer months of July and August (Lam et al., 2003). The same phenomenon 
may happen in many developing countries, because the air conditioner ownership increases 
in close relation to income growth (e.g., Matsukawa and Ito, 1998; Fernandez, 2000; 
Matsukawa, 2001).  
 
Seasonality may have important implications for the demand for electricity. In Albania, the 
electricity use for heating and water heating is currently creating significant seasonal peak   - 14 -
demand during the winter (Figure 4). In summer, the demand is relatively low, because 
residential ownership of air conditioners remains small. But this has been increasing in recent 
years (Table 2). As the result, the demand for peak electricity during the summer may pick 
up, possibly adding more pressures on the need for additional and diverse peak load capacity. 
Especially, it is projected that summer runoff would considerably decline over the long run 
(ESMAP, 2009). Other home appliances, such as electric stoves and water boilers, are also 
considered to generate the electricity demand to a greater or lesser extent (Table 3).
10  
 




































































































Table 2. Electricity consumption, climate conditions and home appliance ownership in Albania 
      2002 2003 2004  2005 
Number of observations  642 1,180 1,332  1,608 
Electricity consumption:  
Monthly electricity consumption (kWh) 371.2 361.2 351.0  349.0 
Monthly payment for electricity (lek)  2,060.7 2,171.6 2,379.2  2,282.9 
Weather conditions: 
Monthly average high temperature (°C)  25.7 29.3 24.3  25.3 
Monthly precipitation (mm)  73.3 29.7 85.9  59.6 
Average number of home appliances:  
Air conditioner  0.04 0.09 0.40  0.29 
TV 1.07 1.10 1.17  0.50 
Washer 0.69 0.67 0.47  0.42 
Electric stove  0.75 0.76 0.47  0.40 
   Water boiler  0.55 0.60 0.50  0.50 
Sources: Albania LSMS data and weather data from IEWE, Albania.  
                                                 
10 Though, the following analysis may not be able to capture the potential impacts of some home appliances, 
such as electric stoves, because the data relies on the household surveys implemented during the spring and 
summer months.    - 15 -
 
Table 3. Sample coverage by month  
   Year                            
2002 2003 2004 2005 
Month  Obs. %    Obs. %    Obs. %    Obs. % 
4  29  4.5                        
5  324 50.5 569 48.2 648 48.7 1,058 65.8 
6  244 38.0 594 50.3 668 50.2 538 33.5 
7  45  7.0  17 1.4  16 1.2  12  0.8 
Total  642  100.0  1,180 100.0  1,332 100.0  1,608  100.0 
Source: Albania LSMS data.  
 
In Albania the climate differs from year to year and depends on location. This variation is, of 
course, of particular importance to identify the climatic impacts on the electricity demand in 
our empirical model. In the sample period, the month of June in 2003 was hotter than usual. 
In that year, air conditioners and other seasonal home appliances may have contributed to 
increasing the residential electricity demand. In addition, climate conditions vary 
significantly across region in the country. The northern and eastern mountainous regions are 
relatively cool in Albania. By contrast, the coastal and southern areas are hotter (Figure 5). In 
2003, temperature was high, exceeding 30°C almost all over the country. Summer 2004 was 
relatively cool. Correspondingly, more precipitation fell over most of the country in 2004 
(Figure 6). Summer 2002 was driest among the sample years.  
 
Figure 5. Monthly average maximum temperature by district  




























Source: Author’s drawing based on weather data from IEWE, Albania.  
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Figure 6. Monthly precipitation by district  






























Source: Author’s drawing based on weather data from IEWE, Albania.  
 
From the longer time perspective, the climate will be changing. The following analysis of 
this paper will remain static to the extent that the data are collected during the fairly short 
period of time and no dynamic consumer response, such as home appliance purchasing, is 
assumed. However, it is still indicative to see the impacts of climatic conditions by 
evaluating the estimated demand function with respect to expected climate change. In 
Albania, average temperature increased around 1 °C in the past 30 years, while precipitation 
declined especially during winter and spring (Figure 7). In the future, temperature is 
projected to increase 1.2–1.8 °C by 2050 and 2.1–3.6 °C by 2100, and more droughts and 
less precipitation are expected (ESMAP, 2009). Therefore, on one hand the electricity 
demand may continue increasing unless significant improvements in energy efficiency of the 
economy take place. On the other hand, the country’s water resources may become scarcer, 
intensifying the country’s climate vulnerability. If more droughts happen, as in 2002 and 
2007, the country will be faced with significant supply shortage, which would lead to either 
massive power outages or costly power imports from abroad. Hence, energy efficiency and 
electricity demand management will remain a critical policy issue for Albania.  
 
   - 17 -
 
Figure 7. Climate changes from 1960 to 1990 in Albania 
  Annual temperature (1960-90)  Annual precipitation (1960-90) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Albania (2002).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL  
 
To investigate the electricity demand, the following demand function is estimated:  
 
i i i i u X I q 1 1 1 1




i q  is the true amount of service consumed by household i, and Ii is an indicator 
function for meter installation. X1 includes a final marginal price applied for each consumer, 
denoted by MP and other covariates. For weather conditions, two variables are included in 
X1: monthly average maximum temperature (TEMP) and monthly precipitation (PREC). In 
principle, the simple OLS could estimate Equation (1) consistently, if metering and other 
explanatory variables, including MP, were exogenous and data were perfectly observed. In 
reality, there are a number of econometric issues―both traditional and untraditional― to 
estimate the equation. Without dealing with these problems, the metering effect α1 and other 
coefficients β1 would be biased. On the traditional side, there are at least five econometric 
issues in the demand estimation literature.  
   - 18 -
Endogeneity of price and quantity. First, the OLS estimator is biased because of the 
traditional simultaneity problem between price and quantity. In a general supply-demand 
model, price and quantity are jointly determined. Thus, without extraneous information (i.e., 
instrumental variables), the model cannot be identified. One might think that this 
simultaneity problem would not matter much in the electricity sector, because prices might 
be regulated and considered to be determined exogenously. However, the block tariff 
structure creates another possibility of endogeneity. Under the block tariff framework, 
consumers can choose the marginal price that would be applied by deciding how much 
electricity they consume. In addition, the block pricing can also cause a measurement error. 
This is because consumers are normally uncertain about which marginal rate would be 
eventually applied before they receive the bills (Deller et al., 1986).
11 Therefore, the potential 
endogeneity of price and quantity needs to be addressed in the presence of block pricing.  
 
In Albania, the marginal rate varies depending on customer classification and how much 
electricity is used (Table 4). During the sample period: 2002-2005, the country adopted a two 
block tariff structure where the first block rate was kept about half of the second block rate. 
While the lower block tariff was increased from 4 lek to 4.5 lek per kWh in 2004, the second 
block rate was gradually raised from 8 lek to 9 lek throughout the sample period. At the same 
time, the threshold between the two marginal tariffs was also decreased substantially. This 
means that the potential benefits from the lower rate were cut on a quantity basis, while the 
marginal price was also raised. These price changes are expected to have reduced the 






                                                 
11 Time-of-day electricity pricing is one possibility to incentivize consumers to monitor their actual 
consumption periodically, as experimented in Hausman et al. (1979). However, it is still open to argument 
whether consumers can really adjust their consumption based on the real-time meter readings.    - 19 -











consumption (kWh) 1/ 
Urban Rural 
2002 4.0 8.0 300.0 356.9 244.4 
2003 4.0 8.1 300.0 356.9 244.4 
2004 4.5 8.9 220.0 363.8 237.0 
2005 4.5 9.0 210.0 363.8 237.0 
1/ Average across districts for the summer period. 
Source: Electricity Regulatory Entity, Albania.  
 
How much people would respond to changes in marginal prices, MP, depends on the price 
elasticity of demand. In the literature the estimates vary significantly, depending on country, 
period and data being analyzed, and methodology adopted. According to a classical literature 
review (Taylor, 1975), the price elasticity is estimated at –1.02 to –2.00 for residential users 
and –1.25 to –1.94 for industrial consumers. A more recent meta analysis shows that the 
average price elasticity of residential electricity demand is –0.35 in the short run and –0.85 
over the long run (Espey and Espey, 2004). With regional aggregate data, Bernstein and 
Griffin (2005) find that the residential electricity elasticities in the United States are –0.24 
and –0.32 in the short and long run, respectively. With micro data, Wilder and Willenborg 
(1975) estimate the elasticity at –1.31 in South Carolina in 1973. Reiss and White (2005) 
report an elasticity of –0.39 for California households during the period: 1993-1997. With 
more detailed micro data on an hourly basis, the time-of-day price elasticity is estimated to 
ranges from –0.13 during peak hours and –0.22 during non-peak hours in Connecticut 
(Hausman et al., 1978).  
 
Nordin’s difference. Second, net positive (negative) consumer welfare caused by the 
increasing (decreasing) block tariff should be included in X1, but it will be another 
endogenous variable for the same reason as above mentioned. Note that the price variable in 
the demand function must be a marginal tariff rate of the final block that each consumer faces, 
rather than the average price (computed as the total bill divided by total consumption). This 
is basically because neoclassical economic theory assumes that people consume goods or   - 20 -
services given a marginal price.
12 Accordingly, those who consume more electricity than the 
first block threshold will benefit from the implicit income effect caused by differences 
among the marginal rates. This is called the Nordin’s difference variable―denoted by 
D―and is calculated by subtracting the actual total bill from what would be paid if the final 
block rate were applied for the total consumption (Nordin, 1976).
13 In the following analysis, 
the endogeneity associated with the Nordin’s difference will be addressed along with the 
above marginal price endogeneity issue.  
 
Dependency on household appliances. Third, as discussed, the residential demand for 
electricity is likely to depend on home appliance holdings (Dubin and McFadden, 1984; 
Reiss and White, 2005). This can be considered as a long-term effect, because home 
appliances are generally durable goods and it takes some time for consumers to decide to 
purchase a new home appliance in response to other exogenous factors, such as income 
growth and climate change. Normally, the increasing ownership of home appliances will 
result in increases in the electricity demand. But this may not always be the case. For 
instance, if a household replaces an old appliance with an energy efficient one, the demand 
may decline. A counterargument is that improved energy efficiency may induce consumers 
to use more home appliances, as in the case of automobiles (e.g., Small and van Dender, 
2007; Frondel et al., 2008). Large-volume consumers may have stronger incentives to 
purchase energy efficient appliances. Therefore, the decision of purchasing home appliances 
is potentially self-selective and may have to be treated as an endogenous variable (Davis, 
2008).  
 
In the following analysis, nonetheless, the household appliances ownership is assumed 
exogenous, because the sample period of our data is relatively short, covering only four 
years: 2002–2005. During this period, home appliance ownership was not changed 
                                                 
12 There is a view that households are rarely aware of the detailed price structure or marginal prices. But the 
marginal and average prices are eventually related to one another (e.g., Wilder and Willenborg, 1975; Terza and 
Welch, 1982; Nauges and van den Berg, 2009).  
13 This is also referred to as virtual income by Hausman et al. (1979).    - 21 -
significantly, as shown in Table 1. Though, the appliance ownership is still an important 
determinant of the residential demand for electricity. Thus, a number of dummy variables for 
various household appliances are included in X1 as independent variables.  
 
Alternative energy choice. Fourth, if there are any important alternative energy sources, 
such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and firewood, those substitutes should be incorporated 
in the estimation model. Ideally, with sufficient data the model should be estimated as a 
system of multiple demand functions (e.g., Nauges and van den Berg, 2009). However, data 
are not always available. Even in a single equation model, the demand function can also 
involve prices of alternative sources (Filippini and Pachauri, 2004). An alternative approach 
may be to introduce another equation for deciding whether or not to connect the service 
(Basani et al., 2008). Behind this approach, it is implicitly assumed that some alternatives 
exist. Given this specification, the conventional Hausman self-selection model can be used 
for estimation.  
 
In the case of Albania, there are few important alternative energy choices for households. 
The country has already achieved almost universal access to electricity network, though the 
quality of supply still remains problematic. The access rate was 99.97 percent in 2005. 
People may use LPG for heating and especially for cooking, but the use of gas may be 
relatively limited, in particular in urban areas.
14 By contrast, many firms are equipped with 
their own private backup facilities.
15 Therefore, no alternative choice is explicitly considered 
in our empirical model. The paper takes into account whether households are using electricity 
or LPG for major household activities, such as heating and cooking. This is expected to 
                                                 
14 There is some difference between the LSMS data and people’s perception about the energy alternative. While 
the LSMS data indicate that some amount of household expenditure was spent for LPG and firewood, people 
perceive that they are largely dependent on electricity for energy. This is partly because there is a considerable 
difference in living conditions between urban and rural areas. In rural areas, firewood is often an alternative 
energy source. According to the 2005 LSMS, some 70 percent of rural households used some firewood for 
heating or lighting, while only 30 percent of urban residents used.  
15 According to the 2005 LSMS, only about 3 percent of households answered that an alternative energy source 
for lighting was power generator. On the other hand, about 80 percent of firms in the country have their own 
backup generators, which are estimated to have generated some 30 percent of firm electricity consumption in 
2006 (Iimi, 2010).    - 22 -
capture some demand shifts caused by the ways of using different energy sources. As will be 
seen, our estimation results indicate that the use of electricity or LPG has certain but not 
much explanatory power to the electricity demand.  
 
Sample bias. Household surveys often have a sample bias problem. Respondents can always 
choose not to provide answers (Yoo, 2007). It is often pointed out that the amount of 
electricity consumption reported in household surveys might be deviated from the amount 
that households actually consumed. In Georgia, for instance, it is found that household 
surveys overstated the actual payments received by a power company (Lampietti et al., 2007). 
In our sample, there is no crucial evidence that Albania’s household surveys suffer from the 
sample bias problem.  
 
Instruments. The current paper adopts three instrumental techniques to deal with the 
endogeneity associated with the marginal price and Nordin’s difference variable. First, the 
marginal price and Nordin’s difference variables are instrumented by their predicted values 
according to the simple expansion of the definition of the Nordin’s difference variable. To 
obtain the predicted values, the actual bill payment is regressed on a constant term and the 
quantity of consumption:  
 
ij ij j j ij
ij j ij j
q Bill
q MP Bill D





where Billij is the amount of bill payment for customer i, who is faced with jth block 
marginal rate. εij represents an error term. The marginal price and Nordin’s difference 
variable can be instrumented by  2 ˆ   and  1 ˆ  , respectively (Hewlett, 1977). However, there 
may remain concern about the fact that the total bill is still a function of quantity and 
marginal price. Therefore, total bills may still feedback onto quantity (Deller et al., 1986).  
 
The second technique is the Terza’s (1986) two-stage probit approach, which essentially 
transforms the endogeneity question to the consumer self-selection problem. It is shown that   - 23 -
the marginal rate applied is dependent on the consumer welfare, which is supposed to be 
maximized by consumer’s self-selection of quantity. In the two-block tariff case, the 
consumer’s self-selection depends on two variables: the sum of two marginal tariffs and the 
sum of two net income transfers. These can be used as exogenous variables for the selection 
equation (Welch and Terza, 1982).  
 
Third, the marginal price and Nordin’s difference variable can be instrumented by the exact 
rate structure characteristics. This is a more common approach in the literature (e.g., Wilder 
and Willenborg, 1975; Deller et al., 1986; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989). The basic idea is 
that the rate schedule is used to linearize a budget set that each household faces (Hausman 
and Wise, 1976; Hausman et al., 1979).  
 
The paper does not use the other alternative approach, which uses household location as an 
instrument (e.g., Naugas and van den Berg, 2009). While this approach has the advantage of 
taking any unobserved measurement errors into account, it does not allow us to examine any 
effects of location-specific covariates, which are often of particular interest from the 
economic policy point of view. In addition, in the case of Albania it does not appear to be 
appropriate to assume that a household’s location choice is independent of electricity 
availability or consumption. The average consumption of electricity appears to differ 
systematically among districts in Albania, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Econometric issues related to metering. Up to here all the econometric issues are 
traditional; without any further complication, the above instrumental variable approaches 
could estimate Equation (1) consistently. However, an additional problem arises if the 
observed amount consumption, denoted 
*
i q  in the equation, is incorrect due to lack of 
metering, or if the meter installation (Ii) in the equation can be treated as endogenous. In the 
case of Albania, both seem to be applicable, as discussed in the previous sections.  
 
At the beginning, suppose that the predetermined normative amount would be unbiased. That 
is, unmetered customers would consume more or less the predetermined normative amounts.   - 24 -
Also, suppose that metering would not be self-selected―for instance, metering is completely 
mandatory. Of course, it is assumed that a vector of X1 controls for everything else related to 
the residential electricity demand. Then, no explanatory power should be left in the metering 
variable, I, in Equation (1). Once the traditional endogeneity issues are addressed properly, 
the two-stage or instrumental variable regression could have an insignificant coefficient α1 
and estimate other parameters consistently. Conversely, if it turns out that metering reduces 
consumption, it means that unmetered customers would be overconsuming electricity for 
non-essential purposes, as theory predicts. In other words, the norm would be underestimated.  
 
Hypothesis: The normative amount is set consistently; thus, metering does not matter to 
electricity consumption.  
 
If the hypothesis be rejected, the estimation model needs to be modified with the fact that the 
norm would likely be underestimated taken into consideration. The reason is that the 
dependent variable is now considered to be only partially observable due to the absence of 
metering. If a customer has no meter, all we can know is that she would likely consume at 
least the normative amount, q .
16 Unlike metered customers, it cannot be observed exactly 
how much electricity unmetered customers are actually consuming. Hence, the actual amount 
of consumption, 
* q , is partially observable, or more precisely, censored at the normative 






otherwise      






q           ( 2 )  
 
where q is the observed amount of consumption in the data. Note that in Albania the norm 
varies depending on household location and season. Therefore, q  is not necessarily unique 
for everyone in the nation.  
                                                 
16 Technically, both over- and underconsumption cases can be examined econometrically; but the paper will 
focus on the former case, which is more plausible in reality and fits our data. It means that q is censored at the 
norm when a household is not equipped with a meter.   - 25 -
 
In addition, the decision of whether to install a meter is potentially endogenous, because it is 
determined by the amount of consumption, which may or may not be observable by the 
econometrician. But each household knows its true amount of consumption, 
*
i q . Depending 
on this, each family decides whether or not to install a meter. This selection seems to be 
possible in the context of Albania; recall that falsification of meter readings and illegal 
connections have long been significant concerns. Therefore, it is potentially reasonable to 
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where I
* is a latent variable for meter installation and I is a dichotomous observable 
realization. The selection mechanism is assumed to follow the tariff structure that each 
household is faced with. Especially, if the norm is low, the incentive not to install a meter 
would be strong, because the bill payment for unmetered customers will be small no matter 
how much electricity they consume. If the norm is set relatively low, people would be more 
likely to stay unmetered as the block rates increase. This is because people could expect more 
“savings” by fixing the amount of consumption, compared to the payment that would be 
charged if metered. Therefore, X2 include the tariff structure information, such as block rates, 
threshold and norm, as well as X1.  
 
Consequently, we have the following two-equation system with censored and observed 
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For computational simplicity, I is treated as a continuous variable, instead of binary. Note 
that I is observable in our case. This can be estimated by the Nelson-Olsen (1978) two-stage 
estimation technique. First, the reduced form for q is estimated by the tobit method over 
 2 1, X X X  , and the reduced form for I is estimated by OLS over X. Then, the equation of q 
is estimated by the tobit method replacing I with I ˆ . Letting the covariance matrix of this 
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where   1 2,J G   . Π2 is a vector of the coefficients from the first stage OLS regression for I. 





1 2       d . While 
2
1   is a variance of the error term of the first stage tobit estimation, 
12   is a covariance between the two reduced form equations. See Amemiya (1979) and 
Maddala (1983) for further detail.  
 
V. DATA  
 
The paper uses household surveys in Albania for four consecutive years: 2002-2005. It pools 
the four surveys. Note that the number of observations for 2002 is relatively small, because 
of lack of information required for the analysis (see Table 3). The total number of 
observations is 4,762. The summary statistics is presented in Table 5. The sample average of 
monthly power consumption is about 350 kWh with a wide range from less than 1 kWh to 
over 4,000 kWh per month. The metering rate is about 88 percent. The average marginal rate 
faced by residential customers is about 8 lek per kWh. Note that all the monetary variables 
are normalized to the 2005 constant term. In theory, the Nordin’s difference variable should 
be positive under the increasing block tariff regime. However, it can be negative in the real 
data, because of possible false data reports on bill payments and censored data on electricity   - 27 -
consumption. In case the Nordin’s difference is negative, it is assumed to take a small but 
positive number to avoid logarithms of zero.
17  
 
Two weather-related variables are selected: monthly average of maximum temperature and 
monthly precipitation. These data are available and presumably considered to be most 
relevant to the electricity demand in Albania. Besides two weather-related variables, monthly 
household income and the number of household members are included in X1 and X2. To 
control the extent to which individual households rely on electricity and gas for their basic 
home appliances, a number of dummy variables representing electricity use and the number 
of home appliances held by each household are also included.
18 A dummy variable for urban 
areas is introduced to control for a systematic heterogeneity between urban and rural areas. 
Urban residents seem to use more electricity; their income is higher, and they own more 
electric appliances.  
 
The model includes a variable that represents frequency of power outages, which is measured 
by the average duration of power outages per day. Households experienced about 3 hours and 
half of power outages during the sample period. For obvious reasons, electricity cannot be 
consumed if power outages occur. This captures some undervaluation of the demand in the 
observed data.  
 
As instrumental variables, two block rates, a threshold between the two blocks and the 
normative amount of consumption applied to those who have no meter. Recall that the block 
rates and threshold are common to the whole nation but vary from year to year. In addition, 
the normative amounts can be different among districts and between urban and rural 
classifications. It also differs between the summer and winter season. The analysis uses the 
only summer tariff schedules to make them consistent with the sample period.  
                                                 
17 An alternative is to use the Nordin’s difference variable as it is. The main estimation results have not change 
much even if the logarithm is not taken.  
18 The home appliance ownership is represented as the number of appliances, rather than dummy variables. Our 
approach is more informative because some households own multiple appliances. But the main estimation 
results have been found robust even if the binary variables are used instead.    - 28 -
 
Table 5. Summary statistics   
      Abb.  Obs.  Mean Std.Dev.   Min  Max
Monthly power consumption (kWh)  q  4762 355.57 207.89 0.24  4,216.11
Dummy for meter installed  I  4762 0.88 0.33 0  1
Marginal price 1/  MP  4762 7.96 1.94 4.21  9.21
Nordin’s difference variable 1/  D  4762 774 655 -5,673  3,684
Monthly average high temperature  TEMP 4762 26.10 3.41 14.60  35.30
Monthly precipitation  PREC  4762 61.42 44.50 2.00 237.70
Monthly income 1/  Y  4762 38,204 52,950 100  1,627,629
Number of household members  HH  4762 4.55 1.60 1  16
Dummy for power use for lighting   4762 1.00 0.06  0  1
Dummy for power use for heating  4762 0.31 0.46  0  1
Dummy for power use for cooking  4762 0.49 0.50  0  1
Dummy for power use for water heating  4762 0.72 0.45  0  1
Dummy for power use for others  4762 0.91 0.28  0  1
Dummy for gas use for lighting   4762 0.01 0.11  0  1
Dummy for gas use for heating  4762 0.44 0.50  0  1
Dummy for gas use for cooking  4762 0.70 0.46  0  1
Dummy for gas use for others  4762 0.01 0.08  0  1
Number of home appliances owned: 
Color TV  4762 1.14 0.51  0  5
Video 4762 0.36 0.50  0  4
Refrigerator 4762 0.96 0.28  0  4
Freezer 4762 0.01 0.12  0  3
Washer 4762 0.72 0.46  0  2
Dishwasher 4762 0.02 0.14  0  2
Electric or gas stove  4762 0.80 0.44  0  6
Air conditioner  4762 0.08 0.33  0  5
Water Boiler  4762 0.63 0.51  0  3
Computer 4762 0.08 0.28  0  3
Duration of power outages per day (hours)  4762 3.59 3.29  0  22
Dummy for urban areas  4762 0.65 0.48  0  1
Memorandum items:  
Monthly electricity payment 1/  4762 2,252 1,825  1  37,000
Block rate below threshold 1/  BR1 4762 4.44 0.15 4.21  4.61
Block rate above threshold 1/  BR2 4762 9.01 0.25 8.42  9.21
Block tariff threshold (kWh)  q0 4762 247.23 41.73 210  300
   Normative amount of consumption (kWh)  q  4678 341.69 73.69 150  400
1/ In constant 2005 Albania lek. 
 
VI. MAIN ESTIMATION RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
First of all, the OLS estimation is performed (Table 6). The price elasticity is found positive. 
This is no doubt biased for many uncontrolled bias factors. Particularly, the positive elasticity 
is attributable to the typical failure to control the price endogeneity under the increasing   - 29 -
block tariff regime. In the raw data, it is natural that larger-volume consumers are faced with 
higher marginal rates by construction. Therefore, the price coefficient tends to be positive 
without proper treatment.  
 
Second, the marginal price and Nordin’s difference variable are replaced with their predicted 
values based on the Hewlett’s expansion of the Nordin’s difference. The price elasticity is 
still positive and significant. As mentioned above, this approach may still fail to remove the 
simultaneity between price and quantity. On the other hand, the metering has a significant 
negative coefficient, meaning that metering matters to electricity consumption. It is 
interpreted as a piece of evidence that unmetered customers are systematically 
overconsuming electricity compared to the norms that they are facing. The similar result has 
been obtained when using the tariff structure as a set of instruments. The metering effect is 
found negative and significant; but the coefficient of the marginal rate is significantly 
positive.  
 
By contrast, the Terza two-stage probit estimation shows that the price elasticity is 
significantly negative at –0.89. This looks to be within a reasonable range in comparison with 
the existing literature. However, the coefficient of metering is found negative but 
insignificant. Therefore, the hypothesis that the norm of consumption is not biased is rejected 
in most cases. The norm is likely to be underestimated. On the other hand, the price effect 
remains inconclusive. The partial unobservability and self-selection of metering may have to 
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Table 6. OLS, 2SProbit and IV estimation with metering assumed to be exogenous  





IV using tariff 
structure  
I  –0.163 *** –0.040 *** –0.003     –0.583 *** 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.026) (0.117)
lnMP 0.565 ***  1.023 ***  –0.886 ***  0.048 *** 
(0.037) (0.065) (0.205) (0.005)
lnD  0.016 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** –0.382 *** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032)
lnTEMP 0.145 **  0.041 0.204 ***  0.087
(0.057) (0.054) (0.049) (0.062)
lnPREC  –0.038 *** –0.023 *** –0.039 ***  –0.022 ** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
lnY  0.020 ** 0.021 ** 0.031 *** 0.027 *** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
lnHH  0.057 *** 0.058 *** 0.086 ***  0.066 *** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022)
D(Power for lighting)  0.144 ** 0.152 ** 0.140 *  0.120 * 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.076) (0.068)
D(Power for heating)  0.068 *** 0.067 *** 0.069 ***  0.052 *** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
D(Power for cooking)  0.037 *** 0.043 *** 0.011 0.046 *** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018)
D(Power for water heating)  0.030 * 0.024 0.035 ** 0.046 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
D(Power for others)  0.023 0.030 –0.004 0.032
(0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.030)
D(Gas for lighting)  0.016 0.032 –0.041 –0.033
(0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.050)
D(Gas for heating)  0.003 –0.001 0.003 –0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
D(Gas for cooking)  –0.037 ** –0.029 *  –0.054 *** –0.015
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
D(Gas for others)  0.090 0.099 0.129 ** 0.106
(0.097) (0.097) (0.063) (0.100)
lnTV 0.0064 *  0.0068 **  0.0001 0.0076 ** 
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0036)
lnVideo 0.0022 ***  0.0021 **  0.0020 ***  0.0025 *** 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009)
lnRefrigerator 0.0043 *  0.0040 *  –0.0013 0.0051 ** 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0023)
lnFreezer 0.0042 0.0038 0.0030 0.0043
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0033)
lnWasher  0.0031 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0012 0.0042 *** 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012)
lnDishwasher  0.0111 *** 0.0112 *** 0.0137 ***  0.0106 *** 
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0027)
lnStove  0.0040 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0029 ***  0.0048 *** 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
lnAirConditioner  0.0103 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0097 ***  0.0119 ***   - 31 -
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0016)
lnWater Boiler 0.0001 0.0001 0.0020 **  0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
lnComputer  0.0041 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0042 ***  0.0042 *** 
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0015)
lnPowerOutages 0.0007 0.0003 0.0016 *  0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
D(Urban)  0.141 *** 0.128 *** 0.167 ***  0.167 *** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022)
Constant  4.223 *** 3.414 *** 6.990 ***  6.767 *** 
   (0.251)    (0.229)    (0.487)    (0.365)   
Obs.  4762    4762    4494    4678   
Adj R-squared  0.552 0.549 0.495
F-statistics  96.78 96.33 62.31
Wald chi2  1780.39
λ 0.180 *** 
(0.053)
Number of district dummies  35    35    34    35   
1/ In the Hewlett estimation model, lnMP and lnD are replaced with the predicted values in the 
equation that expands the Nordin's difference variable. 
2/ One of the district fixed-effects is omitted because it predicts success perfectly.  
Note: The dependent variable is the log of observed electricity consumption (kWh). The robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.  
 
The Nelson-Olsen estimation shows that the metering effect is significant; the coefficient is 
estimated at –1.477. Since the metering variable is not in logarithm, the elasticity of 
electricity consumption with respect to metering can be calculated as about –0.26. This 
confirms that the normative consumption amounts are systematically downward biased. 
Unmetered customers would be likely overconsuming electricity. It is consistent with theory.  
 
The price elasticity is now also considered unbiased and found negative, though statistically 
insignificant.
19 Note that in this specification, the marginal prices and Nordin’s difference 
variable are replaced with their predicted values over the instrumental variables and other 
exogenous covariates. This aims to focus on the issues of partial unobservability and self-
selection of metering and avoid further complications in the estimation. Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
19 An interactive term between the meter installation and the marginal price can be introduced to examine the 
price effect for metered customers. This is because the price effect may be limited when customers do not have 
meters. However, the coefficient of the interactive term has been found insignificant and positive. And the 
coefficient of lnMP remained negative and insignificant.    - 32 -
these main estimation results have been found robust if all the endogenous variables, 
including metering I, are instrumented directly by our instrumental variables (i.e., block rates, 
threshold and norm). Thus, it is concluded that metering is a powerful instrument to refrain 
from non-essential electricity use by households, while the pricing effect is inconclusive. It is 
negative as expected, but the statistical significance is limited.  
 
One of the possible reasons for this is that the data do not have sufficient variation in 
marginal prices during the sample period. The marginal rates were increased but the variation 
is very small (see Table 4). Therefore, it is statistically less likely that the price variable could 
explain the electricity demand. Nonetheless, this does not mean that pricing policies are 
useless to manage the electricity demand, because the Nordin’s difference variable almost 
always has a positive and significant coefficient. By construction, the Nordin’s difference can 
be increased by lowering the first block rate, raising the second block rate or increasing the 
threshold between the two blocks. Therefore, the electricity demand would be reduced by 
raising the first block marginal rate. Similarly, the demand could be curbed by lowering the 
second block tariff and threshold between the blocks. All of these measures will reduce the 
potential benefits of low-volume customers from the increasing block tariff structure.  
 
A policy implication is straightforward: The increasing block tariff mechanism will weaken 
the price incentives to use electricity wisely. In order to take advantage of the price 
incentives to curb the electricity demand, the privilege of the low marginal rates should be 
minimized. This means that low-volume consumers have to pay more. The evidence seems to 
be consistent with the policy argument that the tariff-based subsidies often mistarget the poor. 
It is generally difficult to address the equity issues by tariff-based subsidies. Conditional cash 
transfers may be more preferable to support the poor (e.g., Komives et al., 2005; Goldstein 
and Estache, 2009).   
 
Albania increased the household electricity tariff significantly after the sample period (Table 
7). In 2006, the increasing block tariff structure was abolished. There was no difference in 
marginal rates between low- and high-volume consumers in 2006 and 2007. Notably, the   - 33 -
second block rate was decreased. These were consistent changes with the above finding to 
curb the electricity demand. However, the marginal rate was raised only for large-volume 
consumers in 2008. This created a differential between the two block rates once again. In 
addition, the threshold between the two rates was also raised. Therefore, the implicit income 
transfers were increased. According to our estimation results, the increased Nordin’s 
differential variable would push up the demand for electricity, not bring down.  
 











consumption (kWh) 1/ 
Urban Rural 
Sample period: 
2002 4.0 8.0 300.0 356.9 244.4 
2003 4.0 8.1 300.0 356.9 244.4 
2004 4.5 8.9 220.0 363.8 237.0 
2005 4.5 9.0 210.0 363.8 237.0 
Beyond the sample period:  
2006 7.0 7.0 n.a. 363.8 237.0 
2007 7.0 7.0 n.a. 363.8 237.0 
2008 7.0 12.0 300 376.5 246.8 
2009 7.0 12.0 300 376.5 246.8 
1/ Average across districts for the summer period. 
Source: Electricity Regulatory Entity, Albania.  
 
Turning to the selection equation associated with metering, the Nelson-Olsen estimator 
shows that low-volume consumers are more likely to be equipped with meters (Table 8). This 
is also consistent with the theoretical prediction. There is little incentive for low-volume 
customers to stay unmetered. Moreover, the effects of q  and q0 on I are quite suggestive, 
though not statistically significant. It is indicated that the higher norm might promote meter 
installation. This is reasonable because the possibility of overconsuming electricity would 
shrink if the norm is raised. Further, the increased block tariff threshold might also help to 
increase metering. This is because more people would become able to take advantage of the 
lower marginal tariff, if the threshold is increased. But in order to benefit from this privilege, 
it is required to install a meter, because the norm is set above the threshold in most cases in 
Albania. Therefore, people would be willing to install electric meters. These are statistically 
insignificant, but the Nordin’s difference has a significant impact on metering. Again, if the 
threshold increases, the Nodrin’s difference increases, which would result in higher metering.   - 34 -




Table 8. IV and Nelso-Olsen estimation with metering assumed to be endogenous  
  IV     Nelson-Olsen estimator 1/ 
Dependent variable ln q 
(2nd stage)   I 2/    ln q    
I  –1.024 ***       –1.477 *** 
(0.166) (0.225) 
ln q –1.011 ** 
(0.485)




lnMP –0.088 –0.123 
(0.189) (0.268) 
lnD 0.031 *** 0.026 *  0.029  *** 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.010) 
lnTEMP 0.043 –0.006 0.045 
(0.067) (0.095) (0.093) 
lnPREC –0.020 *  –0.010 –0.014 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
lnY  0.035 *** 0.031 * 0.037  *** 
(0.010) (0.017) (0.014) 
lnHH 0.040 *  0.066 0.049 
(0.024) (0.059) (0.031) 
D(Power for lighting)  0.141 * 0.117 0.139 
(0.084) (0.147) (0.159) 
D(Power for heating)  0.026 0.040 0.029 
(0.020) (0.039) (0.027) 
D(Power for cooking)  0.016 0.047 0.025 
(0.020) (0.053) (0.028) 
D(Power for water heating)  0.052 *** 0.050 0.054 * 
(0.020) (0.033) (0.029) 
D(Power for others)  0.050 0.039 0.049 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.037) 
D(Gas for lighting)  –0.025 –0.030 –0.029 
(0.052) (0.086) (0.093) 
D(Gas for heating)  0.005 0.000 0.005 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) 
D(Gas for cooking)  0.003 0.005 0.006 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.028) 
D(Gas for others)  0.083 0.118 0.097 
                                                 
20 This measure also has an adverse effect on the electricity demand management, as discussed. If the threshold 
is raised, the demand would increase.    - 35 -
(0.113) (0.138) (0.127) 
lnTV 0.0096 *** 0.0094 **  0.0106  *** 
(0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0036) 
lnVideo 0.0033 *** 0.0031 *  0.0035  ** 
(0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
lnRefrigerator 0.0049 *  0.0055 0.0056  * 
(0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0030) 
lnFreezer 0.0022 0.0060 0.0047 
(0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0060) 
lnWasher 0.0065 *** 0.0061 **  0.0074  *** 
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0022) 
lnDishwasher 0.0105 *** 0.0114 0.0113  ** 
(0.0033) (0.0069) (0.0048) 
lnStove 0.0046 *** 0.0043 *  0.0048  ** 
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0019) 
lnAirConditioner 0.0120 *** 0.0119 **  0.0121  *** 
(0.0018) (0.0060) (0.0028) 
lnWater Boiler 0.0002 0.0012 0.0007 
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0019) 
lnComputer 0.0049 *** 0.0051 0.0052  ** 
(0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0026) 
lnPowerOutages –0.0019 *  –0.0017 –0.0022 
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
D(Urban) 0.203 *** 0.122 *** 0.201  *** 
(0.027) (0.051) (0.034) 
Constant 6.303 *** 4.592 *** 6.816  *** 
   (0.459)    (1.105)    (0.634)   
Obs.  4678    4678    4678   
Adj R-squared  0.396 0.204
F-statistics  54.20
Pseud R-squared  0.213 







Number of district dummies  35    35    35   
1/ In the Nelson-Olsen estimator, lnMP and lnD are replaced with the predicted 
values from the 1st stage regressions of the IV estimator. The block rates are 
dropped due to multicollinearity.  
2/ lnMP is dropped due to multicollinearity.  
Note: The dependent variable is the log of observed electricity consumption 
(kWh). The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
VII. DISCUSSION  
 
One unexpected result is that weather conditions have no significant impact on the electricity 
demand. The weather-related variables tend to have insignificant coefficients, regardless of 
model and specification. A possible reason is that home appliance holdings might have   - 36 -
already explained the difference in the power demand associated with weather conditions. As 
shown in Tables 6 and 8, the coefficients are small but significant and positive for most home 
appliances. For instance, the electricity demand elasticity associated with the number of air 
conditioners is estimated at 0.012 in the Nelson-Olsen estimation. Given the relatively low 
prevalence rate of air conditioning in Albania, a 100 percent increase may be possible in a 
fairly short term. Then, the electricity demand would increase by 0.1 percent.  
 
The other reason may be that the data were collected during the summer. As indicated, this 
must limit variations in the demand associated with weather conditions. In addition, the 
quality of data may not be good, because of the absence of metering. This is exactly the 
question that the paper aims to address. Given a large number of observations that we have, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the noise in the data could be somewhat normalized and 
treated as an idiosyncratic error.  
 
Another possible reason may be that the specification is incorrect. However, the results have 
been found robust against the functional form. It has not changed significantly, even if 
different functional forms, such as non-logarithmic and Box-Cox specifications, were 
assumed. An interesting finding is, though, that the temperature relative to the average may 
be more relevant to changes in the electricity demand (Table 9). The effects of temperature 
and precipitation relative to the four year averages are examined. When the weather variables 
are included conditional on the hotter-than-usual and rainier-than-usual weather, the demand 
for electricity is found to increase with temperature. Although the general impact of 
temperature remains ambiguous, it is likely that higher-than-usual temperature would push 
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Table 9. Electricity demand estimation with different specifications for weather variables   
  
Biased OLS  IV estimator  Nelson-Olsen estimator 
I  –0.163 *** –0.156 *** –1.024 *** –1.137 *** –1.477  *** –1.583 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.166) (0.219) (0.225) (0.300)
lnMP 0.565 *** 0.571 *** –0.088 *** –0.188 –0.123  –0.233
(0.037) (0.037) (0.189) (0.210) (0.268) (0.284)
lnD 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.031 *** 0.032 ***  0.029  ***  0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
lnTEMP 0.145 **  0.284 *** 0.043 –0.171 0.045  –0.169
 
  (0.057) (0.087) (0.067) (0.130) (0.093) (0.183)
–0.012 * 0.028 **  0.029 * 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.016)
lnPREC –0.038 *** –0.073 *** –0.020 *** –0.031 * –0.014  –0.028
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)
0.015 *** 0.011 * 0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
lnY  0.020 ** 0.021 ** 0.035 ** 0.037 ***  0.037  ***  0.039 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
lnHH 0.057 *** 0.056 *** 0.040 *** 0.038 0.049  0.047
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032)
constant 4.223 *** 3.905 *** 6.303 *** 7.198 ***  6.816  ***  7.736 ***
   (0.251)    (0.322)    (0.459)    (0.567)    (0.634)    (0.750)   
Obs. 4762 4762 4678 4678 4678  4678
Adj R-squared  0.552 0.553 0.396 0.352
F-statistics  96.78 94.88 54.20 49.86
Pseud R-squared  0.213  0.21
LR chi2  1888.26  1901.12
Other independent variables are omitted from the presentation: electricity and gas usage dummies for particular 
purposes, household ownership of 10 appliances, and district dummies. 
 
Quantile regressions are performed to explore the presumably heterogeneous consumer 
behavior. However, the quantile technique cannot solve the endogeneity problem in price and 
quantity. Hence, the two-stage quantile regression (2SQR) estimator is used (Arias et al., 
2001). Five quantiles are examined: .10, .25, .50 .75, and .90 (Table 10). The quantile 
estimation results have not differed significantly from the main results. However, it is found 
that large- and small-volume consumers are found to have different electricity demand 
functions. This can be interpreted as distributional impacts, because high-income households 
generally use more electricity.  
 
Regardless of quantile, metering has been found useful to contain the demand for electricity. 
But the demand appears less elastic for large-volume customers. They are mostly the rich and 
TEMP TEMP TEMP D ln * ) ( 
PREC PREC PREC D ln * ) (   - 38 -
would continue using electricity regardless of whether metered or not. Similarly, changes in 
the tariff structure will mainly affect small-volume consumers, who are presumably the poor. 
The Nordin’s difference variable has a significantly positive coefficient only for the three 
lowest quantiles. Thus, for instance, if the threshold between the two blocks is lowered, it is 
the poor who would reduce the demand for electricity. The income elasticity is consistent 
with these findings; small-volume energy users are more likely to increase or decrease if their 
income changes.  
 
With regard to the effect of home appliance holding, the use of electricity for water heating is 
found a major factor to add to the household demand for electricity. This is a consistent result 
with the previous results in Table 8. In addition, three home appliances are found particularly 
important in connection with the future potential growth in household income: dish washer, 
air conditioner and computer. For these home appliances, the coefficients are significantly 
positive and increase with the level of electricity consumption. This implies that the 
electricity demand could surge if the economy grows and more people become able to afford 
them, as shown in the literature (e.g., Matsukawa, 2001; Reiss and White, 2005). As income 
increases, more households would have the last column demand function of Table 10. 
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Table 10. Two-stage quantile regression estimation  
   Quantile    
   .10    .25     .50    .75     .90   
I  –1.279 *** –1.267 *** –1.287 *** –1.037 ***  –0.437 ***
(0.227) (0.147) (0.104) (0.152) (0.169)
lnMP 0.080 0.059 0.237 *  0.426  **  –0.093
(0.283) (0.178) (0.123) (0.179) (0.207)
lnD 0.028 *** 0.031 *** 0.025 *** 0.004  0.010
(0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
lnTEMP 0.084 0.150 **  –0.001 0.076  0.059
(0.098) (0.062) (0.043) (0.062) (0.069)
lnPREC –0.024 –0.016 *  –0.038 *** –0.029  ***  –0.020 * 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
lnY  0.070 *** 0.050 *** 0.042 *** 0.039 ***  0.034 ***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
lnHH 0.088 **  0.072 *** 0.005 0.011  0.023
(0.036) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) (0.024)
D(Power for lighting)  0.069 0.071 0.134 * 0.157  0.151 * 
(0.132) (0.101) (0.071) (0.101) (0.094)
D(Power for heating)  0.034 0.020 0.010 0.007 0.038 * 
(0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
D(Power for cooking)  0.055 * 0.032 *  –0.005 –0.027  0.010
(0.030) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021)
D(Power for water heating)  0.050 * 0.065 *** 0.035 *** 0.045  **  0.047 ** 
(0.028) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.022)
D(Power for others)  0.055 0.026 0.024 0.034 0.007
(0.038) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) (0.027)
D(Gas for lighting)  –0.065 –0.027 0.013 0.026 –0.041
(0.094) (0.060) (0.042) (0.062) (0.062)
D(Gas for heating)  0.068 *** 0.022 0.019 * 0.001  –0.033
(0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018)
D(Gas for cooking)  –0.011 –0.015 –0.019 –0.032 *  0.001 * 
(0.031) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021)
D(Gas for others)  0.052 –0.065 0.007 0.073 0.148
(0.131) (0.080) (0.057) (0.081) (0.096)
lnTV 0.0087 **  0.0074 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0031  0.0026
(0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0026)
lnVideo 0.0049 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0030  ***  0.0028 ***
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011)
lnRefrigerator 0.0023 0.0038 *  0.0019 –0.0004  0.0004
(0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0023)
lnFreezer –0.0004 –0.0082 **  0.0004 0.0043  0.0028
(0.0059) (0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0038)
lnWasher 0.0133 *** 0.0094 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0051  ***  0.0047
(0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0015)
lnDishwasher 0.0093 *  0.0089 *** 0.0118 *** 0.0128  ***  0.0135 ***
(0.0048) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0033)
lnStove 0.0067 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0055  ***  0.0049 ***  - 40 -
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014)
lnAirConditioner 0.0080 *** 0.0094 *** 0.0128 *** 0.0131  ***  0.0116 ***
(0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0023)
lnWater Boiler 0.0031 –0.0003 –0.0019 **  –0.0009  0.0010
(0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0015)
lnComputer 0.0003 0.0048 *** 0.0028 **  0.0051  ***  0.0058 ***
(0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0021)
lnPowerOutages –0.0042 **  –0.0019 *  –0.0015 *  –0.0024  **  –0.0024 * 
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0013)
D(Urban) 0.229 *** 0.164 *** 0.198 *** 0.245  ***  0.228 ***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
Constant 5.057 *** 5.352 *** 6.040 *** 5.519  ***  6.313 ***
   (0.670)    (0.416)    (0.289)    (0.419)    (0.465)   
Obs.  4678    4678    4678    4678    4678   
Pseudo R-squared  0.315 0.281 0.268 0.264  0.273
Number of district dummies  35    35    35    35    35   
1/ In the two-stage quantile regression, I, lnMP and lnD are replaced with the predicted values from the 1st 
stage regressions of the IV estimator.  
Note: The dependent variable is the log of observed electricity consumption (kWh). The standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
 
The paper examined residential electricity demand in Albania, with light cast on the potential 
impacts of metering and climatic conditions. Given volatile international energy prices and 
expected global warming, it is becoming increasingly important to manage the demand for 
electricity or energy in general. To achieve the successful demand side management, 
metering is essential because it is difficult to design an efficient pricing mechanism without 
knowing customers are actually consuming energy.   
 
In Albania, metering has long been an alleged concern, including malfunctioning meters, 
falsification of meter readings and illegal connections. The country’s electricity transmission 
and distribution losses have been substantial until recently. This is mostly attributable to 
these nontechnical inefficiencies and partly to technical losses. In addition, Albania is 
considered to be one of the most vulnerable countries to external energy shocks and climatic 
conditions, because the country is dependent more than 95 percent on hydropower for 
domestic electricity generation. In the future, less precipitation is expected and more   - 41 -
droughts could happen. Therefore, it is critical to strengthen the electricity demand 
management and encourage people to increase energy efficiency and reduce non-essential 
use of electricity.  
 
The paper found that metering is a powerful instrument to refrain from non-essential 
electricity use by households. Without metering, customers would likely overconsume 
electricity, compared to the normative amounts applied to them. Although the price elasticity 
is found small and statistically insignificant, it is shown that the electricity demand could be 
curbed by raising the first block rate, lowering the second block rate or decreasing the 
threshold between the two blocks. Thus, as usually indicated in the literature, tariff-based 
subsidies may not be compatible with the economic incentives to motivate efficient energy 
use. In addition, it is found that weather conditions and household ownership of home 
appliances affect the demand for electricity. Particularly, higher-than-usual temperature 
would increase the demand. Therefore, not only metering but also pricing and climatic 
conditions need to be taken into account to manage the electricity demand effectively.  
 
   - 42 -
APPENDIX. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR METERING  
 
This appendix establishes a simple theoretical model to examine whether non-metered 
customers would over- or under-consume electricity. In case some of the customers are not 
equipped proper meters, a common practice is to apply the predetermined normative amount 
of consumption. The normative amount can differ depending on location, household structure 
and/or owned home appliances. For simplicity, however, it is assumed that the normative 
consumption is uniformly set at the average amount of consumption among metered 
customers. The consequence is simple: Overconsumption by non-metered customers would 
happen.  
 
Suppose that there are in total n customers,  n i , , 1  , out of which m customers 
( m i , , 1  ) have meters and the rest ( n m i , , 1   ) are unmetered. Each consumer i’s 
demand for electricity (or water) is denoted by 
*
i q . With maters installed, this value can be 
observed as the amount of billed consumption,  i q . By contrast, in the absence of meters this 
is unobservable and remains to be a latent value. Instead, the recorded value is a normative 
amount of consumption predetermined by a utility operator or regulator, q . This may or may 













i           ( a 1 )  
 
For simplicity, the uniform and linear pricing is considered; the unit rate is uniform for 
everyone and constant regardless of the amount of consumption.
21 In addition, the average 
pricing principle is assumed; this is considered theoretically suboptimal but frequently used 
because of its advantage to achieve full cost recovery, especially under the circumstances 
                                                 
21 In reality, nonlinearity of the tariff structure is another complexity in utility services, which will be taken into 
account in the following empirical analysis.    - 43 -
where the average cost of production continues to decrease with output. The price is 
calculated by the total cost (TC) divided by total consumption measured (or billed):  
 
 
i i q TC p            ( 2 a )  
 
Note that this cannot be calculated based on the actual amount of consumption, 
*
i q , because 
we can observe this only for metered customers. Finally, it is assumed that the normative 
consumption volume is set at the average consumption observed from metered customers 




i i m   
1 ) (           ( a 3 )  
 
Letting Ii be the indicator function for metered customers, consider the incentive for a 
marginal unmetered customer,  1   m i . The current (monthly) payment,  ) ; ( i i I q c , for 















        ( a 4 )  
 
If this consumer decides to install a meter while holding everything else constant, her 



























m n q q
TC
I q c     ( a 5 )  
 
where   is a positive installation cost, which can be a one-time payment but is modeled as a 
part of monthly payment in Equation (a5).    - 44 -
 
When comparing Equations (a4) and (a5), it is clear that the meter installation would bring 
about at least three effects on her payment. First, her bill is now calculated based on the 
actual amount of consumption, not the normative level. This is the most apparent and direct 
effect. Second, although the normative level is no longer applied for this customer, it would 
still affect her payment because the normative amount of consumption is recalculated given 
the newly observed qm+1, i.e.,  ) 1 ( ) (   m m q q .
22 Third, the average price will also be revised, 
because qm+1 is now measureable and the normative level is also adjusted.
23 Therefore, the 
customer’s decision to move from an unmetered to metered tariff structure may not appear 
straightforward. For instance, if an unmetered customer is consuming less than the current 
norm, the meter installation would reduce her payment because of the reduced quantity by 
1 ) (   m m q q . At the same time, however, the applicable unit price may change and increase 
because her move from an unmetered to metered regime would reduce the total amount of 
measurable consumption by  1 ) (   m m q q . The move will also raise the normative consumption 




The net incentive for a marginal unmetered customer to install a meter is:  
 
                                                 
22 If the predetermined level of normative consumption were accurate in the sense that the (m+1)th customer 
actually would have consumed  ) (m q , the normative level would not be changed. However, as will be shown, 
the normative amount would be likely downward biased. Therefore, the normative consumption level must be 
revised.  












  , then the average price would not change. However, this 
condition would not hold in our setting; the normative amount would be downward biased.  
24 In case the customer is consuming more than the norm, everything will reverse: higher consumption but 
lower prices.    - 45 -
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I q c I q c c
       ( a 6 )  
 
The equation suggests several important predictions. First, if   is large, there is no incentive 
to install a meter. This is consistent with the government policy to subsidize meter 
installation especially in units with low-income tenants, as implemented in Albania and other 
countries.  
 
Proposition 1. If the cost of meter installation is significantly high, there is no incentive to 
install a meter.  
 
Equation (a6) also indicates that even if   is small enough, there is no incentive for 
overconsuming customers to install a meter because  0 1 ) (    m m q q . In other words, only the 
customers who are currently underconsuming electricity or water compared with the norm 
would be motivated to install a new meter.  
 
Proposition 2. Even if the meter installation cost is small, there is no incentive to install 
meters if consumers are overconsuming.  
 
Equation (a6) has several interesting comparative static implications. Since the first term is 
the ratio of metered to unmetered customers, the incentive to install a new meter would be 
relatively strong when the majority of customers are equipped with meters. Intuitively, this is 
because the normative amount in effect is expected to be more accurate and would not leave 
much incentive for unmetered customers to keep unmetered. On the contrary, if the majority 
of customers do not have meters, people would be less willing to install a meter. Hence, 
some government’s interventions might be necessary, such as installation cost subsidies, 
aggressive campaigns against non-metering, and mandatory installation by regulation.  
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Proposition 3. In the presence of  , the incentive to install a meter increases with the ratio 
of metered to unmetered customers. Conversely, there is a risk that no one would install 
meters, when the majority of customers have not installed meters. 
 
Finally, holding everything else constant, Equation (a6) means that the incentive to install a 
meter is a linear increasing function with the average price. Note that 






i i q q p q TC .
25 As illustrated in Figure A1, the excess cost of not having 
a meter and thus being used the normative consumption level q , instead of q1 or q2, would 
be much larger when price is higher ( 1 2 p p  ).  
 
Proposition 4. In the presence of  , the incentive to install a meter would increase 
proportionally with the average price, which would be charged when a meter is installed.  
 
Although not all the propositions are necessarily testable with real data, the major theoretical 
consequence of incomplete metering this: Customers would endogenously decide whether to 
install a meter, depending on how much energy or water they intend to use. In addition, the 
presence or absence of meters would also affect the consumption behavior. Especially, 
overconsumption or underestimation of the normative consumption level would be 
unavoidable. It is suggested that unmetered consumers would overconsume electricity, 








                                                 
25 This can also be considered as the highest possible price under the average cost pricing regime under the 
assumption that only metered customers had to pay.    - 47 -
Figure A1. Excess cost of not having a meter and being applied for the normative amount of consumption  
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